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Abstract 
 
Judgments of time can have a crucial role for the choices drivers take while in traffic. At the 
same time drivers’ value of time is often predicted as being the core benefit from new road 
development schemes (Mackie, Jara-Días, Fowkes, 2001; Beesley, 1965). This paper uses the 
theoretical perspective of Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory to investigate how 
time is judged in traffic situations. In particular, it is examined how the framing of time-
prospects, influence the drivers’ judgments. To investigate this a questionnaire was 
distributed on the internet. 213 participants were presented with 6 different situations related 
to time in traffic and asked to choose between two different time-prospects in each of the 6 
situations. The 6 different choice situations were each framed in both a positive and a 
negative formulation. The individual participant was presented with only one of the two 
formulations in each choice situation. 
The results from the experiment indicate that the framing of the specific choice situation play 
a role in drivers’ judgments of time in traffic related situations, as Prospect Theory predicts. 
Also, the results show that special consideration must be given to judgments of time as 
compared to choices involving judgments of objects or money, as the perception of time 
differs from the perception of objects or money. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In general terms human information processing can be divided into three systems: automatic, 
intuitive and controlled (Kahneman, 2002). Traditionally, traffic psychology has been 
concerned with automatic and controlled processes and the relationship between these two 
(e.g. Groeger, 2000). All non-automatic choices have therefore been treated as outcomes of 
controlled processes (for an example, see Bötticher & van der Molen, 1988). In opposition to 
this, recent studies have shown that intuitive processes play the main role in a large part of 
the choices people encounter (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). It is therefore time to take a new 
perspective in the investigation of the processes behind decision-making in traffic situations. 
 
Apart from influencing the decisions made while in traffic, judgments of traffic related time 
also play a major role in analyses of the costs and benefits of different types of transportation 
(Mackie et al., 2001; Beesley, 1965). In economics the predictions of how drivers judge and 
value time spent in traffic has primarily been based on utility theories that assume decision-
makers to be rational, and thereby have been focusing on controlled decision-making 
processes under no influence of the intuitive system.  
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The understanding of how time prospects are judged in traffic situations is, as indicated 
above, a grossly neglected research area, both within transport psychology and economics. 
This paper aims to introduce the topic of intuitive judgments and the resulting choice pattern, 
to the field of judgments of time in traffic. 
 
 
Theoretical background 
Decision-making is a complex and multifaceted topic with relations to philosophy, economics 
and psychology. Theories of ‘Rational Choice’ and ‘Expected Utility’ have long dominated the 
field of human decision-making in economics. These theories are used as a basis for 
economical modeling, allegedly revealing and predicting the consumers’ preferences 
(McFadden, 2006; Fehr & Tyran, 2005), and as such play an important role in planning and 
guidance of political decisions (Mackie et al., 2001). 
During the 20th century it has become clear through extensive empirical work that the 
traditional economic utility theories do not comply with observed decision-making behavior. 
This acknowledgement has lead to a shift of perspective in a large part of the ongoing 
research into decision-making, from a focus on logical and normative rationality to decision-
making theories that take human information processing into consideration. 
 
As early as in the 1950’s psychologists have been concerned with the discrepancies between 
economical decision-making theories and the neuropsychological knowledge of the limited 
capacity of the human information processing system (Simon, 1956, 1964). It puts an 
enormous strain on the information processing system to be perfectly rational, even when 
only in respect to the individual’s own subjective preferences. The rationality assumption as 
described by the two main contributors behind neoclassical utility theory, Neumann & 
Morgenstern (1944/2004), implies that the individual is fully informed of all the existing 
prospects and their possible outcomes, and is unaffected by economically irrelevant 
differences in the description of the prospects. Simon’s extensive research showed that 
Neumann & Morgenstern’s axioms are neither plausible nor necessary to make good 
decisions. In the decades after Simon’s critique several paradoxes (Allais, 1979; Ellsberg, 
1961), where actual behavior is in opposition to the predictions made by utility theories, has 
further questioned the validity of the rationality assumption and the extension of controlled 
processes in general decision-making. 
 
Kahneman & Tversky’s Prospect Theory offers a solution to the mentioned discrepancies by 
using actual observed behavior to form a theoretical understanding of human decision-
making (Miljkovich, 2005). Of main interest for the current paper is the theory’s introduction 
of how the intuitive information processing system plays a role in most decision-making. Even 
though a choice is explicitly considered and consciously available to the decision-maker, the 
processes can be irrational (in the traditional economical sense) and dependent on automatic 
judgments inferred from the individuals’ current reference situation (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). 
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Judgment processes in the 
intuitive system follow a well 
specified pattern. The subjective 
utility shows marginally falling 
sensitivity, as also the traditional 
utility theories proposes, but in 
Prospect Theory prospects are not 
evaluated by their absolute values, 
instead the subjective utility is 
dependent on the individual’s 
current situation or expectations, 
referred to as ‘the reference 
point’. The subjective value of a 
given prospect therefore depends 
on the reference point, and by 
changing the reference point, it is 
possible to manipulate the 
individual’s judgment of a given prospect. The effect of changing the reference point is 
accentuated by the fact that the subjective weighting of negative prospects generally is twice 
as large as the weighting of positive prospects (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The subjective 
utility function in Prospect Theory is named ‘the value function’ and takes the shape shown in 
figure 1. 
 
The shape of the value function is confirmed by a large body of empirical research. The 
results of which show that participants generally decline gambles of the following type and 
instead prefer the status quo situation which represent a certainty of neither winning nor 
loosing anything: 
 
Problem 2 “Would you accept this gamble? 50% chance to win $150, 
and 50% chance to lose $100” (Kahneman, 2002, p. 461). 
 
On the other hand it is seen that participants accept the same gamble if $100 is subtracted 
from the prospects including the status quo situation. Here the choice is between a gamble 
and a sure loss instead of between a gamble and status quo. In this type of situation the 
participants prefer the gamble: 
 
Problem 3 “Which would you choose? Lose $100 with certainty or 50% 
chance to win $50, and 50% chance to lose $200” (Kahneman, 2002, p. 
461). 
 
The two ‘Problems’ demonstrate that people are not unaffected by irrelevant changes in the 
choice situation (e.g.  subtracting $ 100 from the involved prospects) and that people show 
inconsistent preferences. 
Even more problematic for the rationality assumption is the inconsistent preferences seen in 
the following to choice situations: 
 
Fig. 1: Graphic depicturing of the subjective weighting of the outcomes 
of prospects as according to Prospect Theory. Adapted from Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979, p. 279 
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Problem 11 “In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 
1,000. You are now asked to choose between A: (1,000, .50) and B: 
(500)” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 273.). 
 
Problem 12 “In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 
2,000. You are now asked to choose between C: (-1,000, .50) and D: (-
500)” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 273.). 
 
The choice between the same absolute values has been framed in two different ways in 
‘Problem 11’ and ‘Problem 12’. In ‘Problem 11’ participants generally prefer B, whereas the 
exact same prospects in regard to absolute values produce the opposite preferences in 
‘Problem 12’ (that is, participants generally prefer A), due to the change in reference point.  
 
The above mentioned choice patterns has been tested thoroughly in a wide number of 
different situations involving judgments of for example cars, ice cream, ball point pens, 
chocolate, and more abstract things such as insurances, health plans, and working hours (see 
Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). It is therefore of great interest to take a closer look at, how this 
“irrational” choice pattern stemming from intuitive processes influences the judgment of time 
in traffic situations, and the choices resulting from these judgments. 
In the current study Kahneman & Tversky’s experimental paradigm was used to examine how 
drivers choose between different time prospects in traffic related situations. Apart from 
putting a new perspective on how judgments of time can influence decisions made in traffic, 
this approach also provides a basis for understanding whether judgments of time follow the 
pattern described by the value function. 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
All participants corresponded with the following sampling criteria: were between 25 and 65 
years, possessed a valid driver’s license, drove on a regular basis1, and were randomly chosen 
from WEBPOL’s internet panel. 213 participants corresponded with these criteria and 
answered the questionnaire. The mean age of the participants was 43.66 years. 
In spite of the small sample size, the participants correlated fairly well with the general 
characteristics of the Danish population (see table 1). There are minor underrepresentations 
of women and of persons with a low personal income, most likely an effect of the sampling 
criteria. 
 
Procedure 
The questionnaire was distributed by the internet survey company WEBPOL. 610 persons were 
randomly sampled from WEBPOL’s internet panel consisting of approximately 20.000 
voluntary panel members stratified from the Danish population. The 610 randomly sampled 
panel members received an email invitation to complete the questionnaire. In the email the 
panel members were presented with a link that led them to the internet site where the 
questionnaire was placed. 
                                                 
1 More than 100 km a week. 
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Beforehand it was agreed with WEBPOL that the survey would close after the completion of 
approximately 200 questionnaires. The survey was closed after 213 persons had answered 
the questionnaire. These persons will henceforth be referred to as the participants. 
The questionnaire comprised of 6 dilemma pairs, each dilemma pair representing a choice 
situation described in both a positive and a negative frame. (The dilemma pairs are described 
more thoroughly in the next section of this paper.) Each participant was only required to 
answer one of the two dilemmas in each dilemma pair. Which of the two dilemmas in each 
dilemma pair the individual participant was presented with was randomly extracted for each 
dilemma pair. The sequence of the dilemma pairs were on the other hand fixed in order to 
avoid presenting two very similar dilemmas immediately after each other. 
The questionnaire was presented in Danish in correspondence with the sample population’s 
first language. 
 
 
Table 1 The distribution in percent of the participants on selected background variables compared to the 
distribution in percent of the general Danish population. * Statistics supplied from ”Statistics Denmark” 
(http://www.dst.dk/Statistik/ags/Statiskaarbog.asp)  
VARIABEL PARTICIPANTS 
THE DANISH 
POPULATION IN 
GENERAL* 
Male 60,1  49,5 Sex 
Female 39,9  50,5 
25-29 8,4  11,2  
30-39 24,5  26,4  
40-49 27,7  26,3  
50-59 26,4  24,7  
Age 
60-65 13,0  11,5  
- 99.999 kr. 1,0  8,7  
100.000 kr. – 199.999 kr. 10,8  24,7 
200.000 kr. – 299.999 kr. 27,2  19,8  
300.000 kr. – 399.999 kr. 30,8  12,8  
400.000 kr. – 499.999 kr. 11,8  9,9  
500.000 kr. – 599.999 kr. 6,7  9,1  
600.000 kr. – 699.999 kr. 3,6  6,1  
700.000 kr. – 799.999 kr. 2,6  3,5  
800.000 kr. – 899.999 kr. 2,1  2,0  
900.000 kr. – 999.999 kr. 0,5  1,2  
1.000.000 kr. – 3,1  2,5  
Personal yearly income 
Missing:Won’t answer/don’t know  n = 18  
Capital counties 28,5  22,3  
Other counties in Sjælland 14,6  22,7  
Fyn 7,2  8,8  
Zip code area 
Jylland 49,7 46,1 
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Table 2: English translation of the dilemmas of which each participant was presented with one dilemma from every 
dilemma pair on the internet questionnaire. 
 
 
Version .1 Version .2 
D
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a 
p
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r 
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o
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n
d
 6
 
 
You’re on your way to the ferry and still have 100 km left 
on the highway left. The ferry runs once every hour. You 
now have the choice between A or B. 
 
A) Keep driving according to the speed limit. If you 
choose this option you have 50 % chance of catching the 
ferry at 2 p.m. and 50 % chance of having to wait for the 
next ferry at 3 p.m. 
B) Exceed the speed limit by 10 km/h. (20 km/h) If you 
choose this option you have 75 % chance of catching the 
ferry at 2 p.m. and 25 % chance of having to wait for the 
next ferry at 3 p.m.. 
 
 
You’re on your way to the ferry and still have 100 km left 
on the highway left. You have been delayed by 
construction work earlier on your trip. The ferry runs 
once every hour. You now have the choice between A or 
B. 
 
A) Keep driving according to the speed limit. If you 
choose this option you have 50 % chance of catching the 
ferry at 2 p.m. and 50 % chance of having to wait for the 
next ferry at 3 p.m. 
B) Exceed the speed limit by 10 km/h (20 km/h). If you 
choose this option you have 75 % chance of catching the 
ferry at 2 p.m. and 25 % chance of having to wait for the 
next ferry at 3 p.m.. 
 
D
il
em
m
a 
p
ai
r 
n
o
 2
  
You’re on your way home, driving. Usually it’s a 55 min. 
drive, but today you have to choose between two 
different routes, A or B. 
 
Route A) You will be home 20 min. later than the usual 
time with certainty. 
Route B) You have 50 % chance of being at home 10 
min. faster than the usual time and 50 % chance of being 
at home 30 min. later. 
 
 
You’re on your way home, driving. Usually it’s a 90 min. 
drive, but today you have to choose between two 
different routes, A or B. 
 
Route A) You will be home 15 min. faster than the usual 
time with certainty. 
Route B) You have 50 % chance of being at home 45 
min. faster than the usual time and 50 % chance of being 
at home 5 min. faster. 
D
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You’re on your way to a concert and have been delayed 
due to construction work earlier on your trip. The doors 
close when the concert begins. You have approximately 
30 min. drive left on the highway. Which do you prefer? 
 
A) Driving according to the speed limits, and thereby 
having 50 % chance of getting to the concert before it 
begins and 50 % chance of getting there too late. 
B) Exceeding the speed limit with up to 20 km/h, and 
thereby having 75 % chance of getting to the concert 
before it begins and 25 % chance of getting there too 
late. 
 
 
You’re on your way to a concert. The doors close when 
the concert begins. You have approximately 30 min. 
drive left on the highway. Which do you prefer? 
 
A) Driving according to the speed limits, and thereby 
having 50 % chance of getting to the concert before it 
begins and 50 % chance of getting there too late. 
B) Exceeding the speed limit with up to 20 km/h, and 
thereby having 75 % chance of getting to the concert 
before it begins and 25 % chance of getting there too 
late. 
D
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You’re on your way home, driving. Which would you 
choose? 
 
A) 50 % chance of being at home 30 min. sooner than 
expected and 50 % chance of being at home 20 min. 
later. 
B) Be at home at the expected time with certainty 
 
 
You’re on your way home, driving. Which would you 
choose? 
 
A) 50 % chance of being at home 10 min. sooner than 
expected and 50 % chance of being at home 40 min. 
later. 
B) Be at home 20 min. later than expected with certainty 
D
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You’re on your way home, driving. You can choose 
between routes A or B. Usually you go by route B which 
has a speed limit of 100 km/h, but last time you went by 
route B it was under construction. Which route do you 
prefer today? 
 
Route A) The speed limit here is 70 km/h. 
Route B) There is 50 % chance of the construction work 
being finished and the speed limit therefore being 100 
km/t and 50 % chance of the construction work still 
being in progress and the speed limit being 50 km/h. 
 
 
You’re on your way home, driving. You can choose 
between routes A or B. Usually you go by route A which 
has a speed limit of 70 km/h. Route B has just been 
rebuild, but you don’t know whether the construction 
work has finished yet. Which route do you prefer today? 
 
Route A) The speed limit here is 70 km/h. 
Route B) There is 50 % chance of the construction work 
being finished and the speed limit therefore being 100 
km/h and 50 % chance of the construction work still 
being in progress and the speed limit being 50 km/h. 
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Materials 
The 6 dilemma pairs in the questionnaire were modelled from Kahneman & Tversky’s 
experimental paradigm as presented in e.g. their 1979 article. Three of the dilemma pairs in 
this experiment (dilemma pairs 2, 4, and 5) used the same form as the two original problem 
pairs presented earlier in this paper (see the section ‘Theoretical Background’), to establish 
whether the subjective value of time follow the pattern of the value function. The three 
remaining dilemma pairs (dilemma pairs 1, 3, and 6) explored the subjective value of time 
under different conditions by examining three similar choice situations in varying context 
conditions. An English translation of the questionnaire is presented in table 2. 
 
 
Results 
 
In each of the 12 single dilemmas the distribution of the participants’ preferences (A or B) was 
checked for statistical significance. Differences in the preferences across the two dilemmas 
within each dilemma pair were analyzed to see whether the different framings of the 
prospects elicited variations in the distribution of preferences. 
The statistical analyses were performed in SPSS 15.0. Chi2 tests were chosen due to the 
nominal data. The results of the statistical analysis can be seen in table 3 and 4. 
 
In 10 of the 12 dilemmas the participants had a statistical significant preference for one of 
the two time-prospects over the other. In dilemma no. 2.2 and 6.2 the participants showed no 
general preference between the presented time-prospects in these dilemmas. 
In dilemma pair no. 4 there was a statistical significant change in the preferred choice from 
the gain framing (4.1) of the dilemma pair to the loss framing (4.2).No difference in 
preferences between the two formulations of the same choice situation was seen in any of the 
other dilemma pairs. 
Dilemma pairs 1, 3, and 6 were checked for differences across the three dilemma pairs (see 
table 4). The participants’ preferences change significantly both from dilemma pair 1 to 6, 
and from dilemma pair 6 to 3. 
 
Table 4: Distributions of preferred choice compared across dilemma pairs 1, 3 and 6. Both p-values and chi2-værdier 
are round off. All p-values represent two sided analysis. * p < 0,05. 
VERSION DELAYED DUE TO CONSTRUCTIONWORK NEUTRAL 
DILEMMA NO 
1.1 FÆRGE10   
N=112 
6.1 FÆRGE20   
N=117 
3.2 KONCERT20 
N=106 
1.2 FÆRGE10   
N=101 
6.2 FÆRGE20     
N=96 
3.1 KONCERT20 
N=107 
A: KEEP WITHIN 
THE SPEED LIMITS 33,9 % (38) 55,6 % (65) 38,7 % (41) 35,6 % (36) 56,3 % (54) 30,8 % (33) 
B: EXCEED THE 
SPEED LIMITS 66,1 % (74) 44,4 % (52) 61,3 % (65) 64,4 % (65) 43,7 % (42) 69,2 % (74) 
CHI2 TEST 
DIFFERENT SPEEDS Chi2 = 10,8, p=0,001*  Chi2 = 8,4, p = 0,004*  
CHI2 TEST        
DIFF. ACTIVITIES  Chi2 = 6,3, p = 0,012*  Chi2 = 13,3, p = 0,000* 
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    Table 3: Distributions of preferred choice analyzed for statistical significance within each dilemma and between the two dilemmas in each dilemma pair. Both p-values and chi2-
værdier are round off. All p-values represent two sided analysis. * p < 0,05. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DILEMMA PAIR 
RISIK SEEKING         
FERRY10 
REFERENCE DEPENDENT 
TIME 
RISIK SEEKING    
CONCERT20 
VALUEFUNCTION 
REFERENCE DEPENDENT 
SPEEDCHOICE 
RISIK SEEKING         
FERRY20 
DILEMMA NO 
1.1  
Neutral 
N=112  
1.2  
Delayed 
N=101  
2.1    
Gain   
N=116 
2.2      
Loss     
N=97 
3.1 
Delayed 
N=107 
3.2 
Neutral 
N=106 
4.1    
Gain  
N=108 
4.2       
Loss  
N=105 
5.1      
Loss 
N=104 
5.2      
Gain 
N=109 
6.1 
Neutral 
N=117 
6.2 
Delayed 
N=96 
OPTION A 33,9 % 
(38) 
35,6 % 
(36) 
62,1 %  
(72) 
56,7 % 
(55) 
30,8 % 
(33) 
28,7 % 
(41) 
10,2 % 
(11) 
28,6 % 
(30) 
62,5 % 
(65) 
63,3 % 
(69) 
55,6 % 
(65) 
56,3 % 
(54) 
OPTION B 66,1 % 
(74) 
64,4 % 
(65) 
37,9 %  
(44) 
43,3 % 
(42) 
69,2 % 
(74) 
61,3 % 
(65) 
89,8 % 
(97) 
71,4 % 
(75) 
37,5 % 
(39) 
26,7 % 
(40) 
44,4 % 
(52) 
43,7 % 
(42) 
CHI2  TEST 
DILEMMA 
p=0,001* 
chi2=11,6  
p=0,004*  
chi2 =8,3 
p=0,009*   
chi2 =6,8 
p=0,187   
chi2 =1,7 
p=0,000*   
chi2=15,7 
p=0,020   
chi2 =5,4 
p=0,000*  
chi2=68,5 
p=0,000*  
chi2 =19,3 
p=0,011*  
chi2 =6,5 
p=0,005*  
chi2 =7,7 
p=0,229  
chi2 =1,4 
p=0,221  
chi2 =1,5 
CHI2  TEST   
DILEMMA PAIR 
p=0,791             
chi2 =0,1 
p=0,427             
chi2 =0,6 
p=0,230             
chi2 =1,4 
p=0,001*             
chi2 =11,6 
p=0,904              
chi2 =0,0 
p=0,919             
chi2 =0,0 
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Discussion 
 
Framing effects 
The participants’ preferences in dilemma pair no 4 in this experiment indicates that the 
framing effect mentioned in Prospect Theory plays a role when drivers evaluate time-
prospects in traffic related situations. The change of frame produced by subtracting 20 min. 
from all the possible outcomes in the gain situation in dilemma 4.1 making 4.2 represent a 
loss situation, results in a statistically significant change in the distribution of the preferences 
in the expected direction. That is, the participants are more willing to accept the gamble in 
the loss frame than they are in the gain frame. 
Even though the results from dilemma pair no 4 are clear and statistically significant it must 
be recognized that the size of the change in preferences in the current study is considerably 
lower than in Kahneman & Tversky’s original experiments. On top of this, against 
expectations no framing effects were found in dilemma pair 2 and 5, which like dilemma pair 
no 4 is modelled over some of the classical ‘Problems’. These results indicate that the 
complex situation of judging time-prospects in traffic related situations involve special 
processes, not represented in the classical ‘Problems’. 
 
Uncertain time 
In the current experiment the 4th dilemma pair is the only one where framing effects are 
manifested. Dilemmas 2.1, 2.2, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, and 5.2 all represent choices between a certain 
outcome and a 50/50 gamble. In all 6 dilemmas the 50/50 gamble represents the 
mathematically superior choice. In spite of this the participants prefer the certain option in all 
6 dilemmas even when the certain option is a sure loss! These results indicate that the 
participants find it particularly aversive to be uncertain about the time of their arrival. An 
aversion that makes them prefer the sure loss of time rather than facing the uncertainty of a 
potential gain. 
From a psychological point of view this aversion is not very surprising. Perception of time 
differs from perception of other physical entities in that it is dependent on the activities by 
which the time is consumed (Fraisse, 1984). This close relationship between time and the 
content of time is also manifested in the fact that knowledge about the present and 
immediate time perspectives are essential for the individual to be able to schedule and 
control the near future. A loss of this knowledge essentially leads to a small loss of control, 
which is extremely aversive to the individual (se e.g. Seligman 1975) and therefore might 
explain the observed aversion of uncertain time in this experiment. 
 
Time and the content of time 
Dilemma pairs 1, 3, and 6 all involved the same type of situation: driving with the purpose of 
arriving on time for a specified activity, the choice standing between driving according to the 
speed limits and exceeding them. The three dilemma pairs were varied in regard to the 
specified activity and the amount of km/h the participants would exceed the speed limits if 
they chose this option. Not surprisingly the amount of km/h the speeding option represented 
had a significant effect on whether the participants chose to speed or not. Of more interest is 
that the nature of the specific activity at the destination of the drive had a statistically 
significant effect on the participants’ preferences. In dilemma pair 6 where the goal was 
reaching the next ferry less than half the participants preferred to speed. While in 3rd dilemma 
pair where the goal was reaching a concert more than 60% of the participants chose to speed. 
These results indicate, that the content of the time lost and not the specific amount of time 
saved by speeding, was a determining factor for the participants’ preferences. This gives 
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further support for the argumentation that judgments of time prospects differ in crucial ways 
from judgments of objects and money. 
 
 
Final remarks 
 
The results from this experiment show that the decision-making processes in the intuitive 
system identified by Kahneman & Tversky (1979) play a role in judgments of time-prospects 
in traffic related situations. It is clear though that these processes alone can not fully describe 
the complex task these kinds of decisions represent. Especially it seems that the correlation 
between time, the content of time, and perceived control plays a role in this type of decision-
making. Further research on judgment of time under different conditions is needed before 
any conclusions about which consequences the judgment processes have for traffic behavior 
can be reached. 
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